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BAR BRIEFS
commented upon so thait your suggestions may be properly indexed and filed under the provision of the law which you mention
in your letter. Our objective is to get a code as nearly perfect as
the combined efforts of North Dakota lawyers can make it, and
all your suggestions will be welcomed and will be considered.
The lawyers who are working with our law daily are the
ones who can contribute most to its improvement. You must help
us discover the places where improvement can be made. Give
us your opinion on any phase of the prospective new Code
in which you may be interested.
It is proposed to have published in each issue of the Bar
Briefs hereafter something of interest to the lawyers on the Code
Revision and reports will be made to the Bar from time to time as
the work progresses. In the next issue of Bar Briefs, we hope to
give you some of the plans for the new revised Code.

AMK :A

CODE COMMISSION,
By
C. L. Young,
Clyde Duffy,
A. M. Kuhfeld,
Commissioners.

TORTS - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE - INJURIES
AVOIDABLE NOTWITHSTANDING CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE
P, driving north, and D, driving south, collided on an icy
curve. Immediately adjacent to the curve, on D's right-hand side,
was an open place or road. The parties saw each other before entering the curve. The collision occurred before D reached the
point where he could have driven onto the open place. He admitted that by speeding up he could have reached it before meeting P, thereby avoiding the accident. As the motorists neared
each other, they applied their brakes. Skidding produced a
collision, P's action for damages, in which he alleged D rounded
the curve at excessive speed and without due care, was dismissed.
P moved for a new trial. The motion was denied, and he appealed,
predicating error on the ground, among others, that the trial court
did not instruct on the last clear chance doctrine. Held, the
doctrine was inapplicable. Judgment affirmed.
Ramage v.
Trepanier, 283 N. W. 471 (1938).
In defining the factual setup to which the doctrine applies,
it is interesting to note that the court identified itself anew with
the "humanitarian" viewpoint, adopting the position of the Restatement, Torts (1934) Section 479. "Last clear chance," it will
be recalled, is a British-bred exception to the rule of non-liability
where P has been contributorily negligent. It makes D liable
where P negligently exposes himself to inextricable peril, and D
discovers - or by the humanitarian rule should have discoveredthe peril in performance of such duty as he owes P, but fails to
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take reasonable steps to avoid the accident (if such steps would
have averted it). D, the court declared in the Ramage case,
supra, was not required when he saw P's car to anticipate P would
place himself in a position of peril. Instead, D was justified in
assuming P would obey the law of the road and place neither of
them in a position of peril. Zeis v. G. N. Ry., 61 N. D. 18, 236
N. W. 916 (1931). (One is not in a position of peril when he occupies a place where by the exercise of reasonable care for his
own safety all danger may be avoided. State ex rel Workmen's
Comp. Bd. v. G. N. Ry., 54 N. D. 400; 209 N. W. 853 (1926); Zeis
case, supra). From the speed P and D were moving, the court
calculates D had only a "second or two" to avoid harming P after
he became aware, or could have become aware, of P's position of
peril. "Last clear chance" did not apply because the court believed D had no actual last clear chance, in his second or two, to
avert the accident by exercising reasonable care and competence.
The case does not establish to the writer's satisfaction that D ever
was negligent. If this doubt is well-founded, the court might
have refused to apply the doctrine without bothering to inquire
at all whether D had a last clear chance, because by the orthodox
definition, negligence and contributory negligence both must be
present before there is any possibility of applying the doctrine.
The humanitarian view, which puts discovery of a perilous
position on equal footing with reasonable opportunity to discover,
is termed the majority view by text writers. Harper on Torts
(1933) 305; Cooley on Torts (4th ed. 1932) 405. North Dakota
apparently espoused it 28 years ago. Action v. Fargo and Moorhead St. Ry., 20 N. D. 434, 129 N. W. 225 (1910). Minority courts
apply the doctrine only where D actually discovers P's dangerous
situation and then fails to use the reasonable care any available
means to avoid the accident. Among others, the minority seems
to include California, South Dakota, Montana, and New York,
while the Illinois court disdains "last clear chance" altogether.
Isham et al v. Trimble, 5 Cal. App. (2d) 648, 43 P. (2d) 581
(1935); De Noma v. Sioux Falls Traction System, 44 S. D. 10,
162 N. W. 746 (1917) and Miller v. Sioux Falls Traction System,
44 S. D. 405, 184 N. W. 233 (1921) Dahmer v. N. P. Ry., 48 Mont.
152, 136 Pac. 1059 (1913) and Egan v. Montana Central Ry., 24
Mont. 569, 63 Pac. 831 (1901); Panarese v. Union Ry. of N. Y.,
261 N. Y. 233, 185 N. E. 84 (1933) and cases cited; Specht v.
Chicago City Ry., 233 Ill. App. 384 (1924). Michigan is among
the courts in this Reporter Zone which recognize the humanitarian rule. Johnson v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 246 Mich. 52
224 N. W. 448 (1929). Other North Dakota cases on the subject
established that in such states as our own, where contributory
negligence is an affirmative defense, "last clear chance" can be
urged under a general allegation of negligence, and also under a
specific allegation of careless driving. Welch v. Fargo and Moorhead St. Ry., 24 N. D. 463, 140 N. W. 680 (1913).
Hausken v.
Coman, 66 N. D. 633, 268 N. W. 430 (1936).
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